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The impact of trade liberalization on market structures 
when production costs are different 
Abstract: 
 
This paper examines the impact of trade liberalization on market structures in a model with asymmetric firms 
such that comparative-advantage basis for trade exists. We show that, for intermediate values of the trade cost, 
the non-cooperative game leads to an asymmetric market structure. More over, trade liberalization does not 
provide more domestic competition in the lower cost country, even if trade cost is completely abolished, for a 
difference between production costs high enough. Another result is that the tariff-jumping argument must be 
reconsidered when market structures are endogenous. We show that trade cost has no determinate direct impact 
on the firms’ decision to merge internationally.  
 
 
1-Introduction 
 
In the international economics literature, there has been a methodological evolution in 
analysing the relationship between domestic market structures and international trade flows. 
For a long time, it was generally admitted that an open economy, without tariffs or quotas, 
should provide more domestic competition and more domestic producers’ performance1. 
Among the first, White (1974) has explored the possibility of a reverse relationship: he has 
demonstrated that, under some conditions, market structures can influence trade flows. 
However, close to the tradition of the received theory of international trade, he assumes that 
the domestic producer (or producers) takes world prices as given. 
When the emergence of imperfect competition in international trade became evident, it has 
been established that governments’ actions have different impacts in an oligopolistic market 
and in a competitive one, and that market structures may be a deliberate policy choice (Dixit, 
1984). Next, Salant et al (1983) have shown, in a domestic context, the necessity to recognize 
that the firms’ merger decisions are endogenous. Horstmann and Markusen (1992) analyze 
the formation of endogenous market structure in international trade with identical marginal 
                                                 
1 See for example Caves and Jones (1973). 
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costs across countries2. Later, Maggi (1996) examines the impact of optimal trade policies 
with endogenous competition pattern, under complete and incomplete information. 
The increasing process of trade liberalization has induced a rich literature on foreign direct 
investments, multinational enterprises and the firms’ location choice (see for example Motta 
(1992) and Motta and Norman, (1996)), but the literature on merger behaviour during trade 
liberalisation was scarce. Horn and Persson (2001,(a)) take the last key step of the analysis of 
the relationship between market structures and international trade. They provide, in a more 
general framework, a symmetric model of an oligopolistic industry which examines firms’ 
merger behaviour. Assuming that firms’ costs are the same in each country, they obtain 
results contrary to the “tariff-jumping” argument3 since they conclude that firms merge 
internationally with low trade costs and domestically with high trade costs. Applying the 
method developed by Horn and Persson, Straume (2003), introduces an asymmetry by 
considering that one firm is unionised, whereas the others are not. He does not consider the 
possibility of national mergers since he assumes, in an international oligopoly model, that 
there are three firms, each located in a different country. He obtains a tendency towards 
international mergers between unionised firms for low trade costs and a tendency towards 
international mergers between non-unionised firms for high trade costs. Spearot (2004) finds 
also some support for the “tariff jumping” hypothesis. By considering a model where both 
upstream and downstream firms have market power, he shows that international mergers are 
preferred when trade costs are high. However, it is assumed, in all these articles, that firms’ 
marginal production costs are identical. Nevertheless, if it seems now evident that the model 
proposed by Horn and Persson is the suitable one in order to analyse the equilibrium 
interactions between merger formation and trade liberalization, it seems also necessary to 
examine if their results hold when trade liberalization occurs between heterogeneous firms 
                                                 
2 Because they aim to analyze the plant location decisions by firms, they assume different firm-specific and 
plant-specific fixed costs. 
3 Motta (1992) develops also “some unconventional conclusions”. 
 4
and countries. For example, considering that firms located in different countries face 
different level of production costs could be helpful in order to derive some predictions about 
mergers formation following customs unions or free trade areas between such countries. 
Wage differentials are often large between regional agreements’ members: for example, in 
the North American Free Trade Agreement, Canadian and U-S wages were higher than in 
Mexico and differences in production costs were significant in Mercosur, Caricom or 
Comesa. More recently, the EU enlargement involves high wage differentials between old 
and new members4 and a central question is whether the last enlargement’s consequences on 
market structures will be the same as the precedent, or not. More particularly, it is natural to 
ask if the entry of lower production cost countries in the EU will lead to more competitive 
market structures.  
In a completely symmetric model, as shown by Horn and Persson (2001,(a)), a decrease in 
trade cost give rise most of the time to a symmetric duopoly structure, with either domestic 
mergers for higher values of trade costs or international mergers for lower trade costs: faced 
to the same trade and production costs, national and foreign firms have an incentive to form a 
similar market structure. When choosing the market structure in a first stage, all firms face 
the same trade-off: an incentive to form a national merger or an incentive to avoid trade costs 
by forming an international merger. Because of the firms’ symmetry, one structure dominates 
the other at a common value of the trade cost.  
In a model with asymmetric firms such that comparative-advantage basis for trade exists, 
intuition suggests that trade liberalization could give rise to asymmetric market structures. 
We know5 that firms with different production costs can coexist in an imperfectly 
competitive market and are able to export under the condition that trade plus production costs 
fall short of the other country’s autarky price. Nevertheless, the higher-cost firms have a 
                                                 
4 For example, in many sectors, labor costs in France are five times higher than in the Czech republic. 
5 See Brander and Krugman (1980). 
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disadvantage on the foreign market and a level of trade cost exists such that they are unable 
to export while the lower-cost firms keep on trading. In such a context, one could expect that 
firms have different incentives to choose market structure according to trade costs. 
 The aim of this paper is two-fold: (i) to show the impact of trade liberalization on market 
structures when countries have different marginal production costs and (ii) to confront our 
model to the tariff-jumping argument. 
The paper is organized as follow. We present the model in section 2. Assuming in a first step 
that international mergers are not allowed, we analyse the different possible market structures 
according to the level of trade cost. Section 3 characterizes the equilibrium mechanisms. We 
show that for high or low trade costs, firms in each country choose the same market 
structures. For intermediate values of the trade cost, firms with the higher production cost 
have a defensive strategy and choose the less concentrated market structure in order to 
prevent foreign firms from getting too large a part of the market. By contrast, the lower cost 
firms are protected by the trade cost and have an incentive to choose the monopoly structure, 
even if there is no cost saving from merger. It follows that for intermediate values of the 
trade cost, the non-cooperative game leads always to a stable asymmetric market structure. 
Another result is that trade liberalization does not provide more domestic competition in the 
lower cost country, even when trade cost is completely abolished, for a difference between 
production costs high enough. Models focusing on identical firms ruled out this possibility. 
In section 4 we consider the case where international mergers are allowed. When merging, 
firms may choose either to avoid trade cost or to produce only in the lower cost country. As 
in the symmetric production costs models, we obtain results at variance with the tariff-
jumping argument: firms prefer merging nationally with high trade costs and internationally 
with low trade costs. Moreover when firms merge internationally, they choose the marginal 
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cost saving model rather than the trade cost saving one, when the difference between 
production costs is large enough. We conclude in section 5 with a summary of the findings. 
 
2.The model 
 
Following Horn and Persson (2001 (a)), assume that the production of a homogeneous good 
needs one unit of an asset and that four owners are endowed with such units. Owners 1 and 2, 
and their assets are located in country H (home). Owners 3 and 4 (and their assets) are located 
in country F (foreign). The firms’ technology is described by a constant marginal cost, HC in 
home and FC in foreign with CH >CF. Markets are segmented and we assume that firms must 
pay a trade cost (t) when they export. We assume that CH <1 and 0≤t≤1 to ensure that outputs 
and profits are not negative. In each country, there is an identical linear demand: QP −=1 . 
In a first step, assume that merging with a foreign firm is not allowed6. There are several ways 
in which international mergers can be ruled out. One is to assume that national authorities do 
not permit it because of the strategic part played by the concerned sector (the electricity sector 
is one example). 
In a first stage, national owners have the choice between two market structures only. They 
cooperate7 to choose, in each country, the structure of the national market by forming one or 
two firms. The second stage is a Cournot game where firms compete non-cooperatively on 
both markets, taking as given the firms’ choice and the market structure in the other country. 
As enlightened by Brander and Krugman (1983), the rivalry of oligopolistic firms in 
segmented markets may lead to a two-way trade equilibrium under the condition that the 
autarky price in each country exceeds the marginal cost of exports (production cost plus trade 
                                                 
6 We will consider international merger further, in section 4. 
7 Because they are faced to a same production cost, at a country level. 
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cost) by the other. In the case of countries facing the same demand and the same marginal 
production cost, both countries export and a two-way trade occurs at a same limit value of t. 
In our more general case with different marginal production costs in countries, foreign will 
export only if: 
tCP F
H
A +〉          (1) 
And home will export if        tCP HFA +〉           (2) 
Where iAP  (i= H, F) are the autarky prices. 
From (1) and (2) it is obvious that the countries’ capacity to export depends on the level of the 
production and trade costs, but also on the national market structures, which determine the 
autarky prices. It is straightforward that foreign (respectively home) exports are less likely to 
occur with two national independent firms in home (respectively foreign) than with a national 
monopoly. In a more competitive market, the effect of lowering autarky price is to reduce the 
range of trade costs for which foreign exports are sustainable.  
Even if firms choose the same market structure in both countries, because CH  and CF are 
different, the limit values of t for which exports occur are different. 
Let us first determine these limit values. 
 
 The limit values of t according to the market structures 
At the beginning of the game, t=1 and there is a monopoly in each country in autarky. When 
the game starts, t decreases and in each country, firms choose between two strategies: a 
national duopoly { }2,1=HoM  for home and FoM ={ }4,3  for foreign, or a national merged 
structure, { }12=HNM , respectively =FNM { }34 8. The more competitive is one country’s market, 
the lower is the level of trade cost that prevents the other country’s exports. 
                                                 
8 See Appendix 1 for the characterization of the following values of t. 
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According to (2), home firms are able to export, when foreign firms are in structure FoM , if 
ott〈〈0 9, with 
HFo CCt −+= 3
2
3
1             (3) 
And, when foreign firms are in structure FNM , if Ntt〈 , with   
H
F
N C
Ct −+=
22
1 .                (4) 
According to (1), the values of t allowing foreign firms’ exports are ott〈  (when home firms 
are in structure HoM ) with 
FHo CCt −+= 3
2
3
1       (5) 
And Ntt〈  (when home firms are in structure HNM ) with 
F
H
N C
Ct −+=
22
1       (6) 
Obviously, if CH =CF , oo tt = and NN tt = . It is easy to check that, with CH >CF, we have always 
oo tt 〉 , NN tt 〉 , No tt 〈  and No tt 〈 . However, whether No tt 〈  or No tt 〉  depends on the difference 
between the production costs. If this difference is very tiny, then No tt 〈 , but when 
FH CC 10
9
10
1 +〉 , then No tt 〉 . Because we want to illustrate how trade liberalization does impact 
on the market structures when production costs are significantly different, we will focus on 
this last case.  
We summarize the results in figure 1 which gives the ( HCt, ) pairs corresponding to the limit 
values of t defined above, for CF  = 0. 
 
 
 
                                                 
9 This range of trade costs exists for all values of FH CC 3
2
3
1 +〈 . 
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      Fig.1 The limit values of t 
 
For ( HCt, ) pairs above the line Nt , both countries are in autarky, whatever the chosen market 
structures. 
For ( HCt, ) pairs such that No ttt 〈〈 , both countries are in autarky if the other country has 
chosen ioM  (i=H,F) and foreign is able to export at the condition that home is in structure 
H
NM . 
For ( HCt, ) pairs under ot  and to the right of the line Nt  (this implies that CH >1/10), foreign 
exports whatever the chosen market structure by home but home is unable to export whatever 
the foreign market structures. 
For No ttt 〈〈 , a two-way trade occurs when both countries are in NM  but home is not yet able 
to export if foreign is in the duopoly structure. 
Finally, for ott〈〈0 , a two-way trade occurs whatever the countries’ market structures. 
Let us note that with identical firms (CH =CF ), only three ranges of trade costs must be 
considered: for 1〈〈= ttt NN , both countries are in autarky, whatever the chosen market 
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ot   
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ot  
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structures. Between NN tt =  and oo tt = , both countries are able to export at the condition that, 
in the other country, firms have chosen to merge. Finally for oo ttt =〈〈0 , a two-way trade 
occurs whatever the countries’ market structures. 
The above results suggest that, for low ( ott〈〈0 ) and high ( 1〈〈ttN ) trade costs, we should expect 
that firms have incentives to choose non cooperatively the same market structure in both 
countries ( 4,3,2,1=ooM or 34,12=NNM ). When the non-cooperative outcome is the symmetric 
duopoly structure ( ooM ) we have to check if firms could prefer to collude and choose the 
monopoly structure NNM . The other interesting case is when foreign firms have a comparative 
advantage when home chooses structure HNM (if NN ttt 〈〈 ) or HoM  (if oo ttt 〈〈 ). In these cases we 
should expect that firms will choose different market structures in home and foreign and it is 
necessary to check if such asymmetric market structures are likely to occur in equilibrium.  
 
The different possible equilibrium market structures  
 
Before stating the possible equilibrium market structures, we need to define the firms’ 
criterion for choosing between oM  and NM . Following the Industrial Organization literature, 
we assume that national firms choose, in the first stage, the market structure leading in the 
second stage to the higher combined profit (
NMΠ or oMΠ2 ). When NM  is chosen, national 
firms divide up profits equally, since they are identical. 
Let us note that, in the merger literature, it is generally admitted that mergers reduce variable 
costs10. Most of the time when marginal costs are constant, it is assumed, for simplicity, that 
the marginal cost in a merged firm is the minimum of the marginal costs of the merging firms. 
In our model, national mergers do not give rise to any cost savings. Because we want to focus 
                                                 
10 About the sources of possible efficiency gains due to a merger, see Motta M., 2004. 
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on the market structure impact on trade through the autarky prices, we insulate this impact 
from any other change in cost. Our interesting result is that national mergers may arise even 
while production costs are unaffected by them. This contrasts with the traditional result 
obtained by Salant et al (1983) in a homogeneous product Cournot model (without efficiency 
gains from merger) where merger is detrimental to merging partners11. 
 Let us now define the equilibrium market structures in Cournot fashion. Denote NoM  
(respectively oNM ), the structure when home chooses HoM (respectively HNM ) and foreign 
chooses FNM  (respectively FoM ) (See Figure 2). A symmetric non-cooperative equilibrium, 
with a duopoly in each country ( ooM ) occurs if  
o
N
o
o M
H
M
H Π〉Π2 , NNNo MHMH Π〉Π2        (7) 
And Nooo MFMF Π〉Π2 , NNoN MFMF Π〉Π2 .              (8) 
Inversely, the non-cooperative game leads to a symmetric equilibrium with national merged 
structures ( NNM ) if:  
o
N
o
o M
H
M
H Π〈Π2 , NNNo MHMH Π〈Π2       (9) 
And Nooo MFMF Π〈Π2 , NNoN MFMF Π〈Π2       (10) 
    Foreign firms’ choices 
            FoM {3,4}  FNM {34} 
          HoM {1,2} 
Home firms’ choices 
       HNM {12} 
        
         Fig.2 The firms ‘choices 
                                                 
11 Perry and Porter (1985) show that merger is profitable, even if firms compete on quantity, when there exist 
enough efficiency gains from the merger. 
 
o
oM   NoM
 
o
NM   NNM
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When (7) and (8) hold, we must analyze the likelihood of collusion between national and 
foreign firms. Remember that international merger are forbidden but firms are able to choose 
a collusive strategy, even if the competition authorities prohibit such a collusive behavior12. 
Firms prefer deviating from the non cooperative equilibrium structure if they benefit from a 
more concentrated structure, namely if: 
N
N
o
o M
F
M
F Π〈Π2  and NNoo MHMH Π〈Π2 .     (11) 
If (7) and (10) hold (in the same way, when (8) and (9) hold), then a non-cooperative 
asymmetric equilibrium is possible with a NoM  (or oNM ) structure. In this case, it will be 
interesting to verify if firms in the less concentrated structure benefit from the merger in the 
other country13, namely if Nooo MHMH Π〈Π 22  or oNoo MFMF Π〈Π 22 . 
 
3. Equilibrium mechanisms  
 
In characterizing equilibrium, we assume that, in each country, firms aim at maximizing the 
combined profit through their choice of market structure, taking as given the other country 
market structure. Firms’ profits depend on whether they are able or not to export and 
whether foreign firms export or not. It follows that the equilibrium is determined by the 
interaction of three parameters: the difference between production costs, trade cost and the 
market structures. We consider that marginal production costs are constant, while the 
decrease in the trade cost is the result of a regional agreement. Note that, deliberately, we do 
not explicitly interpret t which, for example, may include tariff and non tariff barriers, 
foreign market accessibility, transport and distribution costs. The result of the agreement is 
a decrease in trade cost, by removing tariffs between members, but the final level of t 
                                                 
12 International mergers are observable by a Court while a collusive strategy may stay unobservable.  
13 This result should generalize in an international context the free rider problem shown by Salant et al (1983): 
following a merger formation, the outsiders may gain more than the participating firms to the merger (see also, 
Horn and Persson (2001,b)). 
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depends on the other trade costs’ components. Assuming that t = 1 is the pre-agreement 
trade cost, we consider now the firms’ strategic market structure decisions, according to t. 
Because the relationship between t and marginal costs will clearly influence the firms’ 
choice of market structures, let us summarize our results in as simple a fashion as possible: 
in figure 3 we show the equilibrium market structures for various pairs of values of t and 
CH, CF being fixed14. 
    t 
 
   1  A     t’ 
    
N
NM  
            Nt   
 
              t’           ot  
         t’’   NoM  
               ooM       
      ooM or NNM   ot      tN 
             1/10          1/2   1          CH 
   Fig.3 The equilibrium market structures 
 The heavy lines are the boundaries defining the (t, CH ) pairs for which an endogenous 
change in equilibrium market structure occurs while the light lines are the limit values of t 
(defined in section 2) for which countries exports occur. For (t, CH ) pairs above the 
boundary t’t’, home and foreign firms prefer merging nationally. In the region of the 
parameter space under t’t’ and to the right of  the boundary t’’ Nt  , the Cournot game leads 
to an asymmetric equilibrium NoM . Under this boundary, ooM  is the non cooperative 
equilibrium market structure.  
Let us give some necessary qualifications to these results. 
                                                 
14 In fig.3, we take CF  to be zero without loss of generality. 
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As underlined above, a symmetric equilibrium is more likely to occur for high or low levels 
of trade cost. 
Proposition 1 There exists a value t’, ( No ttt 〈′〈 ), such that for all tt ′〉 the Cournot game 
equilibrium results in a national monopoly in each country. 
 
¾ Starting from a point like A where 1=t  and moving downwards until t reaches 
the light line Nt , countries are in autarky and their profits do not depend on the other 
country market structure. In that special case, maximizing profits leads to 
2
33
1 

 −=Π=Π HMHMH CNooo      (12) 
2
33
1 

 −=Π=Π FMFMF CoNoo       (13) 
or                              
2
22
1 

 −=Π=Π HMHMH CoNNN                 (14) 
    
2
22
1 

 −=Π=Π FMFMF CNoNN       (15) 
It is evident that, FHi ,=∀ , NNoo MiMi Π〈Π2 , for all values of the home production cost HC  
such that Ntt〉 . Because of the anti-competitive effect of the high trade cost, firms don’t care 
about the foreign market and can choose in their home market a monopoly structure which 
maximizes their joint profit. Note that because of the relationship between the trade cost and 
the home production cost on the foreign capacity to export, the value of Nt  is decreasing 
with CH. It follows that the smaller is the difference between production costs the lower is 
the value of t for which both countries stay in autarky. 
¾ A further decrease in t under Nt  allows foreign firms to export if home firms 
continue to choose the monopoly structure. In this case, foreign firms’ profits are given by:  
 15
22
2424
1
33
1 

 −+−+

 −=Π tCCC HFFMF oN    (16) 
          or          
22
3
2
33
2
3
1
22
1 

 −+−+

 −=Π tCCC HFFMF NN      (17) 
where the first parts of the relations are the profit made on the national foreign market while 
the second parts represent the profit obtained by exporting.  
It follows that, because they are still protected by the trade cost, foreign firms’ dominant 
strategy is to choose the monopoly structure15. In this range of trade costs, home firms never 
export and foreign firms have an anti-competitive incentive to form a national merged 
structure. 
For home firms, the output of the game depends on the relative values of (t, CH ). On the one 
hand, home firms want to avoid the monopoly structure in order to prevent foreign firms 
from exporting but on the other hand they have also a national anti-competitive incentive to 
merge. Choosing the duopoly structure, their profits are still given by (12) and we can see 
that NoMHΠ  does not depend on t. In contrast, when they merge, their profit in the NNM  
structure, given by (18) in the range of trade costs No ttt 〈〈 , increases with t.  
2
333
2
3
1 

 ++−=Π tCC FHMH NN .    (18) 
It follows that, when the anti-competitive effect of the trade cost is high enough ( 'tt〉 ), home 
firms prefer the merged structure: the boundary '' tt  gives the (t, CH ) pairs for which the 
home firms are indifferent between choosing a national duopoly or a national monopoly 
( NoNN MHMH Π=Π 2 ). Above this boundary, home firms choose the monopoly structure. It 
follows that for all (t, CH ) pairs above t’t’, the non cooperative game leads to the NNM  
structure. 
                                                 
15 It is easy to check that Nooo M
F
M
F Π〈Π2  and NNoN MFMF Π〈Π2  where ooMFΠ and NoMFΠ are still given by (13) 
and (15). 
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Proposition 2  The non-cooperative Cournot game may result in a stable asymmetric 
market structure NoM  for a large range of values of trade cost and a high enough difference 
between production costs, or for intermediate values of t, whatever the difference 
( FH CC − ). 
¾ Consider first the (t, CH ) pairs under the boundary '' tt  and above the light line 
ot . In this parameter space, home firms prefer a more competitive structure in order to 
decrease the foreign competition and foreign firms, protected by the trade cost whatever 
their market structure, prefer merging. It is interesting to note that, in this range of (t, CH ) 
pairs, the equilibrium leads to autarky in both countries while for higher values of trade cost 
( Nttt 〈〈′ ), foreign was able to export. This discontinuity in trade is a particular result which 
contrasts with the usual idea in international trade literature that a higher decrease in trade 
cost would unambiguously induce more trade. 
It remains to check if, in this case of asymmetric market structure equilibrium NoM , home 
firms benefit from the foreign merger. The answer is no: as we have stressed above, home 
profits (which are still given by (12)) are identical in ooM  and NoM . In both cases, home 
firms are in autarky and the level of trade cost isolates the less concentrated structure from 
any gain from the foreign merger. 
¾ For further decrease in t under ot  and to the right of the straight line Nt , the 
asymmetric market structure NoM is still the unique equilibrium, but now foreign firms are 
able to export even if home firms have chosen the national duopoly structure. The 
corresponding equilibrium profits are:  
22
24
3
4
3
4
1
22
1 

 +−−+

 −=Π HFFMF CtCCNo       (19)  
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and            
2
4424
1 

 ++−=Π tCC FHMH No        (20) 
Let us underline that home firms will now benefit from the foreign strategy since 
N
o
o
o M
H
M
H Π〈Π 22 16: in structure NoM  the equilibrium quantities produced by home firms and 
the equilibrium price are now higher than in ooM  because of the anti-competitive effect of 
the formation of the foreign monopoly17. In that case the results are in line with the 
traditional analysis: foreign merger induces an increase of outsiders’ output and home 
firms’ profit are higher when foreign firms merge. Nevertheless, merger between foreign 
firms is profitable, because it gives them a monopoly on their own market. 
An important result is that this asymmetric market structure which leads to a triopoly 
market in home country (with a monopoly in foreign and only a one way trade) occurs even 
when the trade cost is completely nullified, for difference between marginal costs large 
enough (see Fig.3): in such a case Home does not make any profit by trade liberalization. 
¾ When t decreases to the left of the straight line Nt , home firms are now able to 
export if there is a monopoly in foreign. Foreign firms have two opposite incentives: 
adopting a national duopoly structure in order to avoid home exports and stay in autarky in 
their own market or choosing the national monopoly structure in order to get a higher price 
in their own market knowing that this structure allows home firms’ competition. For trade 
cost high enough, home firms’ competition in the structure NoM  is weak. It follows that 
there exists a limit level of trade costs such that the monopoly structure remains the more 
attractive for foreign firms because the gains from merging overbalance the loss from home 
firms’ increasing competition. The heavy boundary t’’ Nt  gives the (t, CH ) pairs for which 
the foreign firms are indifferent between choosing FoM  (avoiding home firms’ competition) 
                                                 
16 For oN ttt 〈〈 , 
2
5
2
5
2
5
3
5
1 

 ++−=Π tCC FHMH oo . 
17 See appendix 2. 
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or FNM  (leading to home firms’ competition on their national market) 
18. Above this 
boundary, foreign firms choose NM  and the non-cooperative game leads again to an 
asymmetric market structure. 
Proposition 3  
(i) For low values of the trade cost and/or low values of the difference between 
marginal costs, the non-cooperative Cournot game equilibrium results in a duopoly in both 
countries. 
(ii) However, for ott〈〈0 , the firms have an incentive to collude and choose together 
the national monopoly structure. 
¾ Under the boundary t’’ Nt , competition is strong because the anti-competitive 
effect of the trade cost is low and/or production costs are close and the foreign firms’ best 
response is now to choose the national duopoly structure. While merging, the gains from 
concentration should not be sufficient to balance the loss from the home firms’ competition. 
It follows that foreign merger is no more profitable and the equilibrium market structure is 
o
oM . It remains to check whether firms have an incentive to collude and deviate from the 
Nash equilibrium. As long as t is higher than ot , foreign firms have a comparative 
advantage in exporting (while home firms cannot export in this market structure) and no 
collusion is possible. 
A further decrease in t under the light line ot  leads to a two way trade: both countries are 
able to export whatever the foreign market structure. It follows that firms have an incentive 
to protect themselves from the other country’s exports by choosing the more competitive 
national market structure and that ioM  (i=H, F) is, in a non cooperative game, the firms’ best 
                                                 
18 On the boundary Ntt ′′ , FMFM ooNo Π=Π 2  where now 
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 ++−=Π tCCtCC HFHFFM No and 
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
 −=Π HFFMF CtCCoo . 
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response in both countries. However, relation (11) is now true19 and it is evident that, in a 
collusive strategy, firms gain if they merge nationally. If one country’s firms are assured 
that the other country’s firms will not try to gain market share by choosing the duopoly 
structure, then their best choice is also the monopoly structure. The threat of reversal to the 
more competitive structure when one country deviates from the collusive agreement may 
ensure mergers’ stability. Let us underline that, in this case, the equilibrium resulting from 
the non cooperative game is not the profit-maximizing choice of market structure20. 
 
We are now able to summarize our results and derive some predictions about the future 
market structures after trade liberalization between different cost countries, when 
international mergers are forbidden.  
If the trade cost remains high ( 1≤〈′ tt ) despite of the removing of tariffs21, a structure with 
one monopoly in each country is the more probable one. At the opposite, if the post-
agreement trade cost is low ( t under t’’ Nt ) the non-cooperative game involves more 
competition and leads to the fully decentralized structure ooM = {1,2,3,4}. Nevertheless, in 
such a case the competition authorities must be watchful because collusion may be 
profitable for ott〈 . These two only symmetric market structures are possible when firms 
have identical production costs. In our model another market structure is possible: 
intermediate values of trade cost lead, whatever the difference between production costs, to 
a stable asymmetric structure with a national duopoly in the higher cost country and a 
national monopoly in the lower cost country. This asymmetric structure occurs also even if 
the trade cost is completely removed when the difference between production costs is large 
enough. This is a new result: a preferential agreement between countries with different 
                                                 
19 See Appendix 3. 
20 Horstmann and Markusen (1992) shows a similar result. 
21 For example when the transport cost is high between countries.  
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production costs may not induce the lower cost country to more competition and trade 
liberalization may not at all benefit to the higher cost country which is unable to export. 
  
4. International mergers 
 
In addition to the two market structures considered in the precedent sections, firms are now 
allowed to choose to merge, in the first stage of the game, with a foreign firm22. 
In models where firms face identical production costs, it is assumed that trade cost can be 
avoided through such mergers. In our model with different production costs, international 
mergers give now rise to cost savings but merging firms have two possible ways to generate 
efficiencies: either they avoid trade cost by forming an international duopoly, each firm in 
each country producing at his own production cost for his own market or they choose to 
produce only in the lower cost country, utilizing assets from both countries, and compete on 
the other country market. In that last case, trade cost is not avoided.  
In both cases, firms will choose the structure leading in the second stage to the higher 
combined profit. Nevertheless, in case of international merger, the profit is no more equally 
distributed among merged firms which now are not similar. We don’t specify how the 
combined profit is shared, the only constraint being that each firm participating to the 
international merger earns a higher individual profit than in other possible market structures. 
In the trade cost savings case (TCS), the symmetric structure { }24,13=IIM 23 leads to an 
autarkic duopoly in each country. Whatever the level of trade cost, the combined 
international firms’ profits are given by24: 
                                                 
22 We assume that neither a monopolized structure {1234} nor an asymmetric structure where three assets are 
merged (for example {123,4}) are permitted by competition authorities. This assumption is justified by the 
relevance of the dominance concept, particularly in the EU merger control, even if it is not a dominant position 
itself that raises concerns but an abusive conduct which is penalized (see Seabright, 2000). 
23 Or the similar structure { }23,14=IIM . 
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22
2413
33
1
33
1 

 −+

 −=Π=Π FHMM CCITCSITCS     (21) 
In the marginal cost saving case (MCS), internationally merged firms are also in a duopoly 
structure on both countries’ markets and their profits are: 
22
2413
333
1
33
1 

 −−+

 −=Π=Π tCC FFMM IMCSIMCS     (22) 
It follows from (21) and (22) that firms will prefer the trade cost saving structure for high 
values of the trade cost such that *tt〉 with FH CCt −=* 25. This result conforms with the 
literature on foreign direct investment and multinational enterprises’ location choice: 
merged firms decide to remove their production from the higher cost country if the 
difference between production costs is higher than the trade cost.  
 
Proposition 4 
(i)The duopoly structure with two international mergers IIM  is dominated as long as 
the ( HCt, ) pairs are such that the low cost country’s firms are able to maintain an autarkic 
national monopoly on their own market. It follows that IIM  is dominated by: 
9 the monopoly structure NNM  with two national mergers for values of t  such that 
1〈〈′ tt . 
9 The triopoly structure NoM  with a national merger in Foreign for values of t  such 
that ttt N ′〈〈 . 
 (ii)The international structure IIM  dominates the other structures when the low cost 
country’s firms are no more protected by the trade cost and cannot stay in autarky on their 
                                                                                                                                                        
24 It is easy to check that the combined profits are the same, for ott〉 , in the triopoly structure with only one 
international merger { }4,23,1 or { }4,2,13 etc. 
25 It follows that we have to consider only the trade cost saving combined profit when 1〈〈tto , because in that 
range of trade costs, *tt〉  whatever 1〈HC  (see fig.4). 
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national market when they choose to merge nationally ( Ntt〈≤0 ). Whether the firms choose 
the trade cost saving or the marginal cost saving depends on the difference between 
production costs. 
The above results are in contrast with the tariff-jumping argument, like in the symmetric 
production costs models. Our result suggests that the tariff-jumping argument is ruled out in 
models where firms’ merger decisions are endogenous. 
We give now qualifications to our results (see figure 4). When international mergers are 
allowed, foreign firms are the decisive owners because of their comparative advantage: they 
will agree with an international merger only when this comparative advantage is softened to 
such an extent that, while merging nationally, they cannot stay in autarky on their own 
market.  
    t 
 
          t’ 
    
N
NM  
     Nt  
      
              t’          NoM  
           t* 
      IIM (TCS)  NoM  
         IIM (MCS)    tN 
                   1/10         1/2          CH 
    Fig.4 International mergers 
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¾ When 1〈〈ttN , by comparing (14), (15) and (21), it is not surprising to see that 
the combined profits in the international duopoly structure are lower than in the more 
concentrated structure resulting from national mergers26. 
¾ When t decreases, this result still holds27, and the market structures NNM  (when 
Nttt 〈〈' ) or NoM  (when 'tttN 〈〈 ) lead to the higher combined profits. 
Let us give an intuitive explanation for these results. There are two opposite impacts of the 
trade cost on firms’ profits: on the one hand, t limits the exported quantities and the profit 
earned on the other market. It follows that firms have an incentive to avoid t in order to get 
a larger share of the other market. This is the tariff-jumping argument. On the other hand, 
trade cost is a protection for the domestic market and, in models where market structure are 
endogenous, high values of t allow the lower cost firms to choose a national monopoly 
structure leading always to a higher profit than an international duopoly structure. 
Remember that in this range of trade costs home firms are unable to export: they have no 
incentive to avoid the trade cost since their profit increases with t. Foreign firms have a 
comparative advantage: they export and a part of their profit is affected by the trade cost, 
but the larger component of their profit is their own market where they are a monopolist. As 
long as they are protected by high values of t ( 1〈〈tt N ), their anti-competitive incentive to 
form a national monopoly is larger than their incentive to jump the trade cost by choosing 
an international duopoly structure. 
When t reaches lower values ( Ntt〈 ), foreign firms are not protected by the trade cost if they 
merge nationally. They must share their own market with home firms. In each country, there 
is a triopoly market structure NoM ={1,2,34}. Moreover, remember that when t reaches t”, 
                                                 
26 The relation 
2222
33
1
33
1
22
1
22
1
2
1 

 −+

 −〉


 

 −+

 − FHFH CCCC  is always true. 
27 See appendix 4. 
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foreign firms want to protect their market because the anti-competitive effect of the trade 
barrier is no more sufficient and their choice leads to the less concentrated structure 
o
oM ={1,2,3,4}. It follows that for Ntt〈≤0  the incentive to internationally merge is 
stronger28. The main reason of this choice is to get a more concentrated structure (a duopoly 
rather than a triopoly in NoM or a quadripoly in 
o
oM ), not to avoid the trade cost. Moreover, 
remember that, for ( HCt, ) pairs under the line ot  (that means for low values of the trade cost 
and /or production costs) firms could nationally merge if they collude. In this region of the 
parameter space, an international duopoly leads, as national mergers, to a duopoly in each 
country and does not correspond to an increase in firms’ market power. Nevertheless, firms 
will prefer the international merger which creates efficiencies while the national merger 
does not.  
However, the interesting result is that, most of the time, the firms’ incentives are not 
founded on the trade cost-jumping argument. Indeed, when t is low ( *tt〈 ), merger synergies 
are higher in the marginal cost savings model which is chosen: production occurs only in 
the lower cost country. These results suggest that the presumption that international mergers 
occur with high trade costs -“the tariff-jumping argument”- is robust only to the extent that 
firms have no alternative market structure and/or no other motives to merge. In our model, 
firms internationally merge only if this structure leads to an increase in their market power 
(it is the case for No ttt 〈〈 ) or, for a same market power, leads to efficiencies (it is the case for 
00 tt〈〈 when firms collude). 
 
 
 
                                                 
28 Excepted in the northern space of this area: in this little parameter space, the foreign national monopoly is 
protected by trade cost and home firms’ competition is weak. This result strengthens our conclusions about the 
irrelevance of the tariff-jumping argument.  
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5. Conclusion 
Our purpose in this paper was to provide some predictions about mergers formation 
following trade liberalization between countries with different marginal costs.  
Our analysis highlights several main points which contrast with the traditional results and 
may help to evaluate regional agreements schemes between asymmetric countries. One 
result is that a regional agreement between different countries, so that a comparative-
advantage basis for trade exists, may lead to a stable asymmetric market structure with more 
competition in the higher cost country but does not induce a more competitive market 
structure in the lower cost country. This result contrasts with the idea that a more open 
economy should systematically provide more domestic competition. Moreover, we obtain a 
discontinuity in trade flows which are not linear in the decrease in trade cost and we show 
that for high enough differences between marginal costs, the higher cost country may never 
export even if the trade cost is nullified. Both results contrast with the idea that a greater 
decrease in trade cost should systematically induce more trade. We show also the likelihood 
of collusion between countries for low values of the trade cost or/and low difference 
between production costs. Another result is that it seems that the tariff-jumping argument 
must be reconsidered when market structures are endogenous. Trade cost has no 
determinate direct impact on the firms’ decision to merge internationally. Firms prefer to 
merge nationally, even if international mergers are allowed, when they are protected by high 
trade costs. Moreover, in our model, when firms merge internationally, their aim may be not 
to avoid trade cost but to produce at a lower cost. This result contrasts with the idea that 
firms want to merge internationally in order to avoid trade cost. This idea is disrupted when 
firms may choose another more concentrated market structure. 
The principal shortcoming of our analysis is the absence of welfare considerations. For 
example, a crucial question is whether regional trade agreements will be welfare improving. 
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The EU merger control suggests the application of a consumer welfare standard29 by 
answering the following question: do consumers gain sufficiently from merger efficiencies 
in order to offset the anti-competitive effects of an increase in market power? To answer 
this question, it is necessary to consider the motives for the merger: in our model, with high 
trade costs, national mergers’ dominant motive is to increase market power and such 
mergers have a negative impact on consumers welfare. With low trade costs, the 
justification for international mergers is a mix of motives: the increase in market power and 
the search for efficiencies, most of the time through marginal cost savings. It follows that 
international mergers may lead to lower prices and enhance consumer welfare despite an 
increased market power. Anyhow, welfare evaluations of mergers make necessary to 
specify how the combined profits are shared. Moreover, in the EU enlargement context, it is 
not clear if the application of a consumer welfare standard would take into account the 
aggregate EU welfare and identify conditions under which Pareto gains are achieved or 
compare welfare evolutions in new and old EU members. In this way, further research could 
extend our analysis. 
Appendix 1 
In autarky, the profit maximization in home, when the market structure is a duopoly leads 
to the equilibrium autarky price: 
P CA
H
H= +13
2
3
 
And in a merged structure : 
P CA
H
H= +12
1
2
 
The corresponding autarky prices in foreign are: 
P CA
F
F= +13
2
3
   and   P CA
F
F= +12
1
2
 
                                                 
29 On this topic, see De la Mano, 2002. 
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Using (1) and (2), it is straightforward to obtain equations (3) to (6). 
 
Appendix 2 
In structures { }4,3,2,1=ooM or { }34,2,1=NoM , if oN ttt 〈〈 , foreign firms export, whatever the 
market structure in home. 
At the non-cooperative equilibrium, quantities produced by each home firms are 
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5
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1 tCCq FHMH No  and the equilibrium price is given 
by 

 +++=
5
2
5
2
5
2
5
1 tCCP FHMH oo  or 

 +++=
4424
1 tCCP FHMH No . 
Remember that FHo C
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o
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Appendix 3 
Under the line ot , when both countries choose the duopoly structure, firms’ profits are 
given by 
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and when they both choose to merge 
22
3
2
33
2
3
1
333
2
3
1



 −+−+


 ++−=Π ≠≠ tCCtCC ijiijiMi NN . 
It follows that, in this range of trade costs, NNoo MFMF Π〈Π2  and NNoo MHMH Π〈Π2 .  
  
 28
Appendix 4 
For Nttt 〈〈' , we have to compare the combined profits given by (17),(18) and (21). 
Simulations show that , whatever the values of FC  and HC  , 
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When 'ttto 〈〈 , both countries are in autarky because home firms have chosen the less 
concentrated structure and foreign firms cannot export. The international structure is 
dominated since (see (12) and (15)), for all values of 1〈FC : 
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For oN ttt 〈〈 ,whether the trade cost savings or the marginal cost savings model is chosen 
depends now on the difference FH CC − . 
When 
4
3
4
1 F
H
C
C +〈 , then *tt > and the TCS is chosen if firms internationally merge. The 
comparison of the combined profits shows (see (19), (20), (21))that the international structure 
is dominated: 
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If 
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H
C
C +〉 , then the MCS is more profitable but the international structure30 is still 
dominated: 
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30 Any international triopoly structure is also dominated. Results are available upon request from the author. 
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For lower values of the (t, HC ) pairs such that Nttt 〈〈′′ , firms are in structure NoM when 
international mergers are forbidden but now, in this structure, there is a two-way trade and the 
combined profits of firms 1 and 3 (for example) are now given by: 
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 These combined profits are lower in (25) that these given by the LHS in (24) because foreign 
country’s market structure is now a triopoly while it is a monopoly in (24). On the other hand, 
the combined international profits given by the RHS in relations (24) and (26) increase when t 
decreases. In the same way, it is easy to check that the combined international profits increase 
in the RHS of relation (23) for lower values of HC . It follows that firms have an incentive to 
merge internationally when the trade cost falls under Nt . All simulations show that, for *tt < : 
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and that, for *tt >  
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 −< FH CC  excepted for the highest few values of t in the northern area. 
It is not surprising that this result holds for tt ′′〈  since, in this range of trade costs, when 
international merger are forbidden, either firms are in the more competitive structure or they 
collude and nationally merge, but without merger efficiencies. In both cases, firms will prefer 
to internationally merge, if it is allowed. 
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